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ABSTRACT: Public diplomacy is an international political communication activity 
to which States and other organizations resort in order to achieve political 
objectives abroad and to establish positive relations with foreign publics. It is an 
activity that has evolved to adapt to the new global context, adding new 
characteristics and giving place to the so-called “new public diplomacy”. One of 
the different variants of public diplomacy is mediatic diplomacy, whose end is to 
get the public diplomacy’s message transmitted by institutional media or to get a 
positive coverage by foreign media. This article proposes a specific process to 
apply the framing theory as a tool for political discourse analysis, an essential 
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element of mediatic diplomacy. The process is applied to George W. Bush’s 
political discourse during the first months of the “War on Terror”. 
 
 
RESUMEN: La diplomacia pública es una actividad de comunicación política 
internacional a la que recurren Estados y otras organizaciones, con el fin de lograr 
objetivos políticos en el exterior y establecer relaciones positivas con públicos 
externos. Se trata de una actividad que ha evolucionado para adaptarse al nuevo 
contexto global, incorporando nuevas características y dando lugar a la denominada 
“nueva diplomacia pública”. Entre las distintas variantes de diplomacia pública se 
encuentra la diplomacia mediática, cuyo fin es lograr que el mensaje de la diplomacia 
pública se transmita a través de medios institucionales o reciba una cobertura 
positiva en medios de comunicación extranjeros. Este artículo propone un proceso 
específico para aplicar la teoría del framing como herramienta de análisis del 
discurso político, elemento fundamental de la diplomacia mediática. Un proceso que 
se aplica al discurso político de George W. Bush en los primeros meses de la “Guerra 
contra el Terror”. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last decade, the interest for public diplomacy has been notably intensified in the 
academic and diplomatic arena. The renewed relevance that the United States granted to 
public diplomacy after 9/11 and the emergence of a new conception of this activity, that 
has been called “new public diplomacy”, have contributed to it. This article considers 
mediatic diplomacy as a fundamental component of both the more traditional public 
diplomacy and of the “new public diplomacy”. Therefore it addresses, in the first place, 
the characterization of mediatic diplomacy inside the broader and more debated concept 
of public diplomacy. Secondly, the so-called Bush Doctrine and the public diplomacy 
strategies developed during the “War on Terror” are explained, paying special attention 
to the role that mediatic diplomacy played on them. The third part addresses the 
empirical use of the framing theory in the analysis of political discourse, a fundamental 
element of mediatic diplomacy. Based on the contributions of Jim A. Kuypers, Robert 
M. Entman and Stephen D. Reese, a specific process of analysis is proposed. Finally, 
the process is applied to the analysis of Bush’s discourse in two case studies located in 
the first months of the “War on Terror”: the first one spans from 9/11 to the beginning 
of the Afghanistan War, and the second one includes the months before the beginning of 
the Iraq War. 
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2. Public diplomacy and mediatic diplomacy 
 
Public diplomacy is an international political communication activity. Teresa La Porte, 
for example, has defined it as “the art of cultivating public opinion in order to achieve 
foreign policy goals [...]”1. From this more instrumental perspective, which prevails in 
the practice of traditional public diplomacy, the activity is understood as a tool to serve 
the image and foreign policy interests of those who perform it (mainly states and 
international organizations, like the European Union). It is understood that those who 
perform it are worried about the opinions and behaviors of other countries’ citizens 
because of their importance for their interests, since other countries’ citizens influence 
the decision-making and actions related to foreign policy of their respective 
governments or organizations. 
 
The allusions to a “new public diplomacy” come up in parallel with the evolution that 
traditional public diplomacy experiences to adapt itself to the new global context. Some 
innovative traits attributed to “new public diplomacy” are the incorporation of new 
technologies, the further promotion of dialogue, the active involvement of non-
governmental agents, the aim of encouraging nation-building and the incorporation of 
practices from marketing and public relations2. Regarding this last trait, it is important 
to note Juan Luis Manfredi’s contribution. Aware of the changes in the international 
arena affecting public diplomacy, Manfredi bets on the development of communicative 
strategies in line with foreign policy and that correspond to an ordered pattern with 
mission, vision, objectives and results measurement. This includes the identification and 
analysis of relevant audiences, the design of campaigns and construction of messages, 
the execution of campaigns and an evaluation of results3. The process is very similar to 
the process followed in marketing and public relations campaigns. 
For Kathy P. Fitzpatrick, the most prominent feature of “new public diplomacy” is its 
more discursive perspective of the activity itself: the emphasis would be placed on 
cooperation, understanding and mutual benefit. Accordingly, Fitzpatrick has defined 
“new public diplomacy” as “the management function that establishes and maintains 
mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and the publics on whom its 
                                                            
1 LA PORTE, María Teresa, “The Power of the European Union in Global Governance: A Proposal for a 
New Public Diplomacy”, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 1, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, 
2011, p. 13. 
2 Cfr. SEIB, Philip, Toward a New Public Diplomacy. Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2009; CASTELLS, Manuel, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, 
Communication Networks, and Global Governance”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, vol. 616, nº 1, 2008, pp. 78-93; COWAN, Geoffrey, ARSENAULT, Amelia, 
“Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy”, The 
Annals of the American Academy and Political Science, vol. 616, nº 10, 2008, pp. 10-30; NOYA, Javier, 
Diplomacia pública para el siglo XXI. La gestión de la imagen exterior y la opinión pública 
internacional, Ariel, Barcelona, 2007; FITZPATRICK, Kathy R., “Advancing the New Public 
Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, nº 3, 2007, pp. 
187-211; MELISSEN, Jan, The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005; VAN HAM, Peter, “Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of 
PR and IR Theory”, Millenium-Journal of International Studies, vol. 31, nº 2, 2002, p. 249-269. 
3 Cfr. MANFREDI, Juan Luis, “Hacia una teoría comunicativa de la diplomacia pública”, Comunicación 
y Sociedad, vol. 24, nº 2, 2011, pp. 199-225. 
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success or failure depends”4. Contributions like that of Fitzpatrick raise a number of 
questions about the basis that should guide public diplomacy (or “new public 
diplomacy”): Should public diplomacy look for the achievement of foreign policy 
interests (instrumental perspective) or the aim should be to achieve a network 
cooperation in which relations were managed to obtain mutual benefit (discursive 
perspective)? Is it possible to combine both perspectives? 
Beyond the distinction between traditional public diplomacy and “new public 
diplomacy”, or between the instrumental and discursive perspective, it is important to 
note that there are different types or variants of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy 
and mediatic diplomacy are present since the beginning of public diplomacy; nation 
branding and niche diplomacy are more recent. Cultural diplomacy is characterized by 
the realization of cultural and educative activities; mediatic diplomacy resorts to the 
media as the main channel to promote political discourse; nation branding tries to 
convey a favorable image of a country5 and niche diplomacy develops strategies aimed 
to influence or to acquire prominence in specific ideas or themes, as well as in specific 
audiences. 
Mediatic diplomacy6, object of interest in this article, resorts to the media as the main 
instrument to ensure that political discourse has an echo and is transmitted abroad in a 
favorable way, be it in a direct way (through them, in the case of institutional media) or 
in an indirect way (influencing or having a positive coverage on them, in the case of 
foreign public and private media). Mediatic diplomacy is an activity that works in the 
short and medium term, and whose traditional actors are political personalities and 
diplomatic representatives. Among its most characteristic actions are the speeches, press 
conferences, interviews, comments to the media, media events and the organization of 
specific informative activities. The object of these actions is to promote a specific view 
of actuality, to defend political decisions and to provide information. In conclusion, the 
political message that receives media coverage abroad could be considered as mediatic 
diplomacy. And, if the coverage is positive, it could be considered as successful 
mediatic diplomacy. So, mediatic diplomacy can be understood as an essentially 
instrumental public diplomacy variant. However, the current generalization of new 
technologies and social networks, and their repercussion in traditional media, could 
                                                            
4 To define the “new public diplomacy”, Fitzpatrick adopts the definition that Cutlip, Center and Broom 
give for public relations, according to the symmetric bidirectional model. 
CUTLIP, Scott M., CENTER, Allen H., BROOM, Glen M., Effective Public Relations, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985, p. 2, cited in FITZPATRICK, Kathy R., op. cit., p. 190. 
5 The book Retos de nuestra acción exterior: Diplomacia pública y Marca España, which addresses the 
challenges of the Spain Brand from different perspectives, illustrates the multiple dimensions that make 
up the image of a country abroad. 
Cfr. ALONSO, Gabriel, MANFREDI, Juan Luis, RUBIO, Rafael (eds.), Retos de nuestra acción 
exterior: Diplomacia pública y Marca España, Colección Escuela Diplomática, 2012. 
6 I´ve chosen the term “mediatic diplomacy” (“diplomacia mediática” in Spanish), because I wanted to 
make a distinction between the noun “media” (the media: radio, television, papers…) and the adjective 
“media” (referring to receiving coverage by the media: media coverage). Literature in this regard, mainly 
in English, use the terms “media diplomacy” or “mediated public diplomacy”. I consider the term “media 
diplomacy” more appropriate to refer to specific situations in which the media themselves take the 
initiative and act as diplomatic actors. I also consider that the term “mediated public diplomacy” could be 
more appropriate to refer to any public diplomacy initiative that receives foreign media coverage (and 
which does not necessarily transmit a political message, such as a cultural exhibition). To consult 
contributions of different authors on this respect, cfr. AZPÍROZ, María Luisa, Diplomacia pública: El 
caso de la “Guerra contra el Terror”, UOC, Barcelona, 2012. 
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modify the understanding and practice of mediatic diplomacy, resulting in a more 
discursive activity. 
Returning to the previous questions it could be stated that, in reality, the instrumental 
and discursive perspectives of public diplomacy coexist from the beginnings of public 
diplomacy. Traditional public diplomacy includes activities of discursive nature, such as 
cultural diplomacy activities. And, while the “new public diplomacy” can give more 
weight to the discursive perspective, the strength and impact of political discourse is 
still an important element. The fact that public diplomacy serves the interests of a 
country or organization necessarily implies that it is an instrumental activity, but this is 
not incompatible with the adoption of strategies and actions typical of the “new public 
diplomacy” or of a more discursive perspective of the activity. 
 
 
 
3. The “War on Terror” and the role of mediatic diplomacy 
 
As stated, 9/11 made the United States’ interest in public diplomacy reappear. So, the 
“War on Terror” was accompanied by public diplomacy strategies, whose message 
relied on the Bush Doctrine. The term Bush Doctrine is employed to refer to the ideas 
on security and foreign policy that supported the “War on Terror” actions and the 
United States’ public diplomacy message7. It can be summarized in three premises. 
First, the United States does not make distinctions between terrorists and those who 
support or harbor them: nations will have to choose between fighting terrorists or 
sharing their fate8. This gives place to a fight against an enemy that may include both 
terrorist groups and states. The second premise is based on the National Security 
Strategy of September 20029, which was applied to the Iraq War. The document 
containing the strategy suggests the possibility that the United States conduct 
“preemptive strikes”10 if it is necessary for security reasons, so is must be prepared to 
                                                            
7 Cfr. SINGH, Robert, “The Bush Doctrine”, in BUCKLEY, Mary, SINGH, Robert, The Bush Doctrine 
and the War on Terrorism. Global Responses, Global Consequences, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 
12-32; BOTES, Marina, The Public Diplomacy of the United States of America in the War on Terror, 
Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2007. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-11192007-
141127/unrestricted/dissertation.pdf [access November 10, 2012]. 
The term Bush Doctrine became popular to refer to the military and security strategy of Bush 
Administration in the “War on Terror”. 
8 Cfr. BUSH, George W., Decision Points, Virgin, London, 2010. 
9 Cfr. MILITARY EDUCATION RESEARCH LIBRARY NETWORK. “The National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America”, 17/09/2002. http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf [access 
November 10, 2012]. 
10 Authors like Alastair Finlan note that neither the National Security Strategy of 2002 nor Bush talked 
ever about “preventive strikes”, but about “preemptive strikes”. According to Antony J. Blinken, the 
distinction between “preventive” and “preemptive” is important, since the idea of a “preventive war” is 
much more controversial than the idea of a “preemptive war”, and it is more stigmatized in international 
relations. For Blinken, the difference would lie in the imminence factor: a “preemptive war” is developed 
against adversaries that are an imminent threat or are about to attack, while a “preventive war” is 
developed against adversaries that could be a threat or could attack in the future. Although Bush 
Administration talked about “preemptive strikes”, in the months before the Iraq war the critical sectors 
considered that the Bush Doctrine defended “preventive strikes”. Many claimed that such strikes are 
contrary to international law; therefore they constitute aggression and are illegitimate. 
Cfr. FINLAN, Alastair, “International Security”, in BUCKLEY, M., SINGH, R., The Bush Doctrine and 
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stop rogue states and their terrorist allies before they are able to threaten or to use 
weapons of mass destruction against the country and their allies and friends11. That is to 
say, the “War on Terror” would be done on the offensive and not on the defensive, 
attacking enemies abroad before they could attack at home. The third premise of the 
Bush Doctrine is based on the same document, which also links terrorism to the lack of 
elements like freedom, democracy and free enterprise. A governance model based on 
these elements would be the only sustainable model and the one the United States 
should promote in order to achieve national success, to end terrorism and to secure 
peace. 
The “War of Ideas” (2001-2005), the first public diplomacy strategy of the “War on 
Terror”, tried to improve the image of the United States abroad in order to conquer “the 
hearts and minds” of the moderate Muslims against terrorism messages, as well as to 
achieve international cooperation in the “War on Terror”. In order to do that, it was 
necessary to design the United States’ message properly, spreading the values of its 
culture in a successful way and explaining its policies12. 
The second one, the “Transformational Diplomacy” (2005-2009), is developed after the 
military intervention in Iraq in the spring of 2003 and after the outbreak of scandals 
such as the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo or the knowledge of the 
existence of secret prisons and CIA flights in Europe. Therefore, the aim was to 
transform global attitudes towards the United States and its policies, promoting 
understanding among cultures and religions and convincing about the success and 
convenience of the “War on Terror”. The strategies also pleaded for a democratic 
transformation of countries, especially in the Middle East, and to accomplish this 
transformation through the development of civil society and the collaboration with it 
(nation building)13.  
The academic community has shown consensus in the consideration that the 
instrumental perspective was in general dominant in the public diplomacy developed by 
the United States during the “War on Terror”14. During the “War of Ideas”, apart from 
the political discourse, mediatic diplomacy initiatives were launched. For example, the 
creation of specific agencies to coordinate communications (such as the Pentagon’s 
Office of Strategic Influence or the White House’s Office of Global Communications); 
of institutional mass media that alternated information with entertainment and were 
aimed mainly at a Muslim and young audience (such as Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, Al 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the War on Terrorism. Global Responses, Global Consequences, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 150-
164; BLINKEN, Antony J., “From Preemption to Engagement”, Survival, vol. 45, nº 4, 2003, pp. 33-60; 
SHUE, Henry, RHODIN, David, Preemption. Military Action and Moral Justification, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007. 
11 Cfr. MILITARY EDUCATION RESEARCH LIBRARY NETWORK, op. cit. 
12 Cfr. BEERS, Charlotte, “The United States, Europe, and the Muslim World: Revitalizing Relations 
after September 11”, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15/05/2002. 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/10377.htm [access November, 10 2012]. 
13 Cfr. AZPÍROZ, María Luisa, op. cit. 
14 Cfr. CULL, Nicholas J, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past”, CPD Perspectives on Public 
Diplomacy, Figueroa Press, Los Ángeles, 2009; LA PORTE, María Teresa, “La diplomacia pública 
americana. Lecciones para una comunicación internacional”, Comunicación y Sociedad, vol. 20, nº 2, 
2007, pp. 23-59; SNOW, Nancy, TAYLOR, Philip M., “The Revival of the Propaganda State: U.S. 
Propaganda at Home and Abroad Since 9/11”, International Communication Gazette, vol. 68, 2006, pp. 
389-407; SNOW, Nancy, Propaganda, Inc. Selling America´s Culture to the World, Seven Stories Press, 
New York, 2002; HOFFMAN, David, “Beyond Public Diplomacy: Weapons of Mass Communication”, 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, nº 2, 2002, pp. 83-95. 
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Iraqiya or Al Hurra); and of institutional publications (such as Irak: From Fear to 
Freedom, Irak: A Population Silenced or Iraq´s Voices of Freedom). The 
“Transformational Diplomacy” included initiatives such as the reality road On the Road 
in America, starring young Muslims travelling the United States; or the creation of a 
Rapid Response Office to follow world news about the United States and to offer a 
coordinated and consistent message to foreign publics. There was an attempt to take 
more advantage of new technologies in order to encourage interactivity in the media, in 
line with the “new public diplomacy” and with a more discursive perspective. However, 
the possibilities of dialogue were not exploited enough, and messages remained 
unidirectional15. 
In any case, political discourse pronounced in speeches, press conferences and 
interviews, especially that of George W. Bush because of its content and global media 
coverage, constituted the main asset of mediatic diplomacy during the “War on Terror”, 
as well as the backbone of the United States’ public diplomacy in general16. Therefore, 
stopping to analyze it is of great interest. The empirical application of the framing 
theory is a good option for it17. 
 
 
 
4. Use of framing in discourse analysis 
 
In the field of Communication, framing is the process by which different actors use the 
language to define and construct interpretations on issues and to connect it with a 
broader context18. In Political Communication, framing is the process by which political 
actors (politicians, the media, social movements...) select and establish priorities when 
interpreting and explaining reality19, appealing to symbols and ideas shared by the 
members of the same society20. Politicians turn to framing constantly, in order to give 
explanations and communicate their ideas and proposals to citizens. 
The framing theory can be applied to the analysis of political discourse employing 
different methodologies (quantitative, qualitative or mixed) and identifying different 
variables, such as framing mechanisms or reasoning mechanisms/functions of framing. 
                                                            
15 Cfr. TAYLOR, Philip M, “Can the Information War on Terror be Won? A Polemical Essay”, Media, 
War and Conflict, vol. 1, nº 1, 2008, pp. 118-124. 
16 Although some of Bush’ speeches were theoretically aimed at a United States audience (such as his 
speeches at the Congress), their content and international media coverage allow considering them also as 
mediatic diplomacy actions. 
17 According to Robert M. Entman and the “cascading activation model”, an exhaustive study of mediatic 
diplomacy and its impact employing the framing theory should include the analysis of political discourse, 
an evaluation of its influence in the media and of the media’s influence in the audience. Also how 
influences work upwards in the cascade and other type of influences, such as private pressure or global 
media news frames. In my thesis, I analyze Bush’s speech and its influence on the Spanish press. 
Cfr. AZPÍROZ, María Luisa, op. cit.; ENTMAN, Robert M, “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: 
The U.S. Case”, The International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 13, nº 2, 2008, pp 87-102. 
18 Cfr. KINDER, Donald R., NELSON, Thomas E., “Democratic Debate and Real Opinions”, in 
CALLAGHAN, Karen J., SCHNELL, Frauke, Framing American Politics, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, Pittsburgh, 2005, pp. 103-123. 
19 Cfr. ENTMAN, Robert M., “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case”, The 
International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 13, nº 2, 2008, pp. 87-102. 
20 Cfr. SÁDABA, Teresa, Framing, el encuadre de las noticias. El binomio terrorismo-medios, La Crujía, 
Buenos Aires, 2008. 
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The so-called framing mechanisms are the focal points that serve to identify a particular 
frame21. For example, the use of key words and phrases, descriptions, metaphors, 
examples, historical and cultural references that, because of its symbolic content or 
repetition, are attributed to a specific frame. For its part, reasoning mechanisms (causal 
analysis, consequences and effects, appealing to principles) provide justifications or 
arguments for the adoption of certain frames22. Robert M. Entman talks about four 
functions of framing (which turn out to be very similar to reasoning mechanisms): 
problem definition, causal analysis, remedy and evaluation23. The interrelation of the 
four functions of framing results in frames: narratives with which to promote a number 
of interpretations. According to Entman, the more relevant functions of framing are 
problem definition, because it predetermines the rest of the frame; and remedy, because 
it directly promotes support (or opposition) to public policies24. 
This article applies a qualitative analysis methodology that proceeds as follows: 
First, and based on the frame analysis system proposed by Jim A. Kuypers, the themes25 
related to the “War on Terror” about which the United States president talks in the 
selected speeches are identified, as well as the interpretations he  provides. During the 
process of identification of themes and interpretations, framing mechanisms are 
indirectly found (for example, descriptions, key phrases or historical references). The 
most striking ones are commented in the presentation of results, either in the text or in 
footnotes. 
Second, the interpretations found are classified according to the functions of framing 
they exert: problem definition, causal analysis, remedy and evaluation. Due to space 
constraints, Bush’s complete frame or narrative is not going to be presented, but only 
the two most important functions of framing according to Entman: problem definition 
and remedy.  
Finally, and according to Stephen D. Reese, framing is considered as a process in 
constant activity that includes and excludes interpretations through time. The evolution 
of the two functions of framing, from the first case study (from 9/11 to the beginning of 
the Afghanistan War) to the second one (the months before the Iraq War) is described. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
21 Cfr. TANKARD, James W, “The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing”, in REESE, 
Stephen D., GANDY, Oscar H.J., GRANT, August E., Framing Public Life. Perspectives on Media and 
Our Understanding of the Social World, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, 2001, pp. 95-106. 
According to Tankard, in the identification of framing mechanisms in the media, attention is usually paid, 
for example, to the location of informative or opinion pieces, to the elements with more impact (front 
pages, collective headings, headings, leads, photographs...) or the presence of different sources. 
22 Cfr. GAMSON, William A., MODIGLIANI, Andre, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear 
Power: A Constructionist Approach”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 95, nº 1, 1989, pp. 1-37. 
23 Cfr. ENTMAN, Robert M, Projections of Power. Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004, p. 6. 
24 Íbid., p. 6. 
25 “A theme is the subject of discussion, or that which is the subject of the thought expressed. The frame, 
of course, is suggesting a particular interpretation of the theme”. 
KUYPERS, Jim A., “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective”, p. 302, in D´ANGELO, Paul, 
KUYPERS, Jim A., Doing News Framing Analysis. Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, Routledge, 
New York, 2009, pp. 286-312. 
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5. George W. Bush’s discourse in the “War on Terror”: two case studies 
 
To analyze Bush’s discourse, a fundamental part of mediatic diplomacy in the “War on 
Terror”, two case studies have been chosen. The first spans from 9/11 to the beginning 
of the Afghanistan War, and the second one includes the months before the Iraq War. 
The political discourse about the two main military interventions of the “War on Terror” 
takes place in these periods. Besides, these are two interesting cases to compare, taking 
into account the different reception Bush’s discourse had in different places of the 
world. The analysis of the two case studies allows also checking how the United States’ 
political discourse evolves, from the global commotion generated by the terrorist attacks 
to the international crisis regarding the possible Iraq War. 
For the first case study, statements and speeches that allow observing how the message 
of the “War on Terror” was initially shaped have been selected. Bush’s statements on 
September 11, 12 and 13, 2001, are the first ones after the terrorist attacks, and some 
key ideas that supported the war against international terrorism are stated on them. The 
speech to both houses of Congress on September 20, 2001, has been included because it 
is the first one the President pronounces before the nation’s political representatives 
after 9/11, because a political strategy is already configured on it and because of the 
symbolism it contains. The announcement of the start of the Afghanistan War on 
October 7, 2001, has been considered as relevant because it represents the official 
beginning of the “War on Terror”. Finally the speech before the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on November 10, 2001, is included because the President addresses 
the “War on Terror” message to political representatives from the entire world. 
The material selected for the second case study includes, first, the State of the Union 
Address on January 29, 2002, because it represents the beginning of the debate about 
Iraq: the existence of an “axis of evil” formed by Iraq, Iran and North Korea is pointed 
out for the first time. Also the speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
September 12, 2002, since Bush focuses almost exclusively on explaining to the 
international political representatives the threat that Iraq represents. To see how the 
political discourse on Iraq evolves, the State of the Union speech, pronounced on 
January 28, 2003, has been included. Finally, the statements and press conferences of 
the Azores Summit hold on March 16, 2003, are included because it is the last time, 
before the Iraq War, that Bush explains to the international community the threat that 
Hussein’s regime represents26. 
In order to confirm that the speeches analyzed had international media coverage and can 
be considered as mediatic diplomacy, their coverage in the main Spanish newspapers 
(El País, El Mundo and ABC) at that moment was taken as reference. Information, 
opinion and analysis pieces alluding to the speeches and statements that constitute the 
analyzed sample, the two days after these were delivered, were counted: 
 
 12,13,14,15 
September 
2001 
21,22 
September 
2001 
8,9 
October 
2001 
11,12 
November 
2001 
30,31 
January 
2002 
13,14 
September 
2002 
29, 30 
January 
2003 
17, 18 
March 
2003 
EL PAÍS 10 3 5 5 3 8 10 14 
EL MUNDO 11 6 3 2 3 6 8 19 
ABC 6 3 4 3 6 5 6 11 
 
                                                            
26 See references of the speeches and statements analyzed at the end of the bibliography. 
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5.1. First case study: 9/11 and the Afghanistan War 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked, both in the United States and in 
many other countries, a turning point in the perception of threats to global security. The 
policy priorities of the Bush Administration were drastically modified: from 9/11 and 
for the rest of his term, the first objective and main concern of the United States 
government would be the fight against international terrorism, a fight that Bush named 
with the expression “War on Terror”. The United States discourse focused on Osama 
Bin Laden, mastermind of the attacks and leader of the Islamist terrorist group Al 
Qaeda, and on the “War on Terror”, a defense strategy against terrorism whose first 
initiative would be the military intervention in Afghanistan. This was to get Bin Laden 
and the terrorists, to defeat the Taliban government, considered a terrorist accomplice as 
well as illegitimate and brutal with the Afghan people, and to bring democratic freedom 
to that country. 
–Main themes identified: 9/11, terrorists, terrorism, Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, 
weapons of mass destruction, Taliban regime, Afghanistan, “War on Terror”, United 
Nations resolutions, Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
–Problem definition: 
According to Bush’s discourse, the 9/11 events are “more than acts of terror”: they are 
“acts of war”27. It´s the “war of the 21st century”28, declared against the United States 
but also against the entire “civilized world”29, against freedom-loving people 
“everywhere in the world”30, since a shared civilization is threatened31, the way of life 
that freedom and democracy provide32. 
For the United States, the first direct attack since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 
takes place on 9/11. The vulnerability of its defense system is revealed33. For the 
“civilized world” in general, it is a new kind of war, because it is declared by a new 
kind of enemy: international terrorism. 
According to Bush, the terrorists are the heirs of the murderous ideologies of the 20th 
century, such as fascism, nazism and totalitarism, and they will follow their same path: 
disappearance34. They sacrifice human lives to advance their radical views, and they 
neglect all values in their eagerness to gain power35. They are distinguished from 
                                                            
27 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National 
Security Team”, 12/09/2001. 
28 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Pledges Assistance for New York in Phone Call with 
Pataki, Giuliani”, 13/09/2001. 
29 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”, 
20/09/2001. 
30 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President…”, op. cit. 
31 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to United Nations”, 10/11/2001. 
32 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation”, 
11/09/2001; “Remarks by the President…”, op. cit. 
33 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
The parallelism between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor was especially suggestive for the American people, since 
in both cases there was an attack against civilian and military objectives from the air, unprovoked and 
with the predictable result of a war. 
34 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
35 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
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previous enemies because they attack and then they hide36. Bush points at “a collection 
of terrorist organizations informally affiliated and known as Al Qaeda”37, also 
responsible for the bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998 and for the attack against the United States navy destroyer USS Cole in 2000. This 
group and their leader, Osama Bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in 
different countries, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad or the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan. All of them form a “global terror network”38 that exploit poverty and 
despair and trains its member in camps where the tactics of terror are taught39. Few 
countries meet the rigorous criteria of brutality and oppression of terrorists, so everyone 
is a potential target40. The definition of the new enemy is completed in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in November 2001, when Bush points at a new danger 
that threatens the civilization shared by all, and whose perception has been intensified 
following Bin Laden’s statements in an interview with a Pakistani newspaper. The same 
terrorists who want to end the way of life that freedom and democracy provide, search 
“weapons of mass destruction” to turn their hate into holocaust41. If they got these 
weapons, be them chemical, biological or nuclear, nothing could prevent them from 
using them.  
But Bush highlights that the enemy is not only international terrorism: it is formed also 
by the governments that support it42. The main accused is the Taliban government of 
Afghanistan, a country where the worldview of Al Qaeda is realized43: 
 
…we condemn the Taliban regime. [...] It is not only repressing its own people, it is 
threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. 
By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder44. 
 
So, the Taliban regime is doubly denounced. On the one side, because it is an ally of Al 
Qaeda and a sponsor of international terrorism. Furthermore, it has condemned the 
Afghan people to misery and starvation, besides brutally restricting all kinds of 
freedom45. 
 
–Remedy: 
Bush’s consideration of 9/11 attacks as acts of war allows him to respond in terms of 
war, the “War on Terror”, which includes the possibility of applying military solutions. 
It is important to note that a war against “terror”, a more symbolic word and with more 
resonance than “terrorism”, allows including a broader and more undefined enemy, 
which includes both terrorists and states46. 
                                                            
36 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President…”, op. cit. 
37 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
38 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
39 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to…”, op. cit. 
40 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to…”, op. cit. 
41 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to…”, op. cit. 
The use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” referring to chemical, biological and nuclear arms has 
an important symbolic potential, since it refers to the possibility of killing a large number of people.  
42 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
43 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
44 WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
45 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
46 The first days Bush use the term “War on Terrorism”, but since September 16, 2001, he substitutes it 
for the term “War on Terror”. 
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Therefore, the “War on Terror” is a strategy of fight against terrorism, on multiple 
fronts. Bush describes it as a war in which freedom faces fear47; in which, as in the 
Second World War, the “civilized world” struggles to defend its way of life and its 
principles, which along with freedom are progress, pluralism and tolerance48. The “War 
on Terror” is based on the idea that to achieve peace those who threaten it must be 
pursued49, destroying terrorism wherever it grows50. From the outset, Bush talks about a 
war that will be long51 and that will be won “through the patient accumulation of 
successes”52. It will therefore be a different war, which will go beyond retaliation and 
isolated strikes53. It is for this reason that Bush rejects any comparison with the quick 
war against Iraq on 1990 or with the air war over Kosovo on 1999, where not a single 
soldier was lost54. Thus, the “War on Terror” begins with Al Qaeda and Afghanistan, 
but goes beyond: it is about defeating the “global terror network”55, and not only 
through military actions, but using all the possible resources56. 
The United States president says that the obligations that the new conflict creates to the 
international community are defined in the Resolution 1.373, adopted by the Security 
Council of the United Nations on September 28, 200157. Such obligations involve 
taking energetic measures against terrorist funding, sharing intelligence with other 
countries, coordinating efforts to enforce the law and preventing the terrorists from 
possessing weapons of mass destruction. But Bush goes further in the diplomatic arena, 
and requests democratic nations a full engagement against terrorists, without exceptions 
or excuses. He also requests them to collaborate in an agenda of peace and prosperity 
throughout the world, which would work as an alternative of opportunity and hope 
against terrorism58. 
Regarding the specific case of Afghanistan, on September 20, 2001, the President 
demands the Taliban government to take a series of immediate measures, “not open to 
negotiation or discussion”, if it doesn´t want to share the fate of the terrorists59. These 
measures consist of handing over the leaders of Al Qaeda, releasing unjustly imprisoned 
foreigners, closing terrorist training camps and letting the United States verify that they 
are no longer operational. Since these demands were not met, on October 7, 2001, Bush 
announces the beginning of the military intervention in Afghanistan (the “Operation 
                                                            
47 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit.; “President Bush Speaks 
to…”, op. cit. 
48 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
49 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to the Nation”, 07/10/2001. 
50 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
51 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President…”, op. cit.; “Presidential Address 
to…”, op. cit. 
52 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to…”, op. cit. 
53 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
54 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
55 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
56 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to...”, op. cit. 
57 The Resolution 1.373, of September 28, 2001, completes the Resolution 1.368 of September 12, 2001, 
which legitimates the struggle against terrorism just one day after the attacks. 
Cfr. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, “Resolution 1.373 (2001)”. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001) [access November 10, 2012]. 
58 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to…”, op. cit. 
59 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session…”, op. cit. 
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Enduring Freedom”)60. The targets are the terrorist camps of Al Qaeda and the military 
installations of the Taliban regime. The United States President notes that another 
important part of the campaign will be the humanitarian aid to the Afghan people: while 
striking military targets, they would drop food, medicines and supplies61. Once defeated 
the Taliban government, the United States, along with other countries, with the United 
Nations and with development banks, will help rebuild the country. And it will work 
with the United Nations to support a post-Taliban government that represents all the 
Afghan people62.  
Finally, the President sees the importance that making a proposal for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has for the “War on Terror”. The United States wants a return to 
negotiations, and that both Israel and Palestine live as two states, in peace and security. 
But this requires that both renounce forever “to incitement, violence and terror”63. 
 
 
 
5.2. Second case study: the months before the Iraq War 
 
In the State of the Union address of January 2002 George W. Bush noted the existence 
of an “axis of evil” consisting of regimes susceptible to use weapons of mass 
destruction and the terrorists to whom these could be delivered, and he specifically 
mentioned Iraq, Iran and North Korea. This marked the beginning of an intense 
international debate that would be extended until March 2003. The debate focused on 
the alleged link to terrorism and the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq, 
as well as the possibility of a military intervention in the country. The discourse with 
which the United States President defended his stance on Saddam Hussein’s regime 
during the months before the attack was of key importance to foreign policy, because 
divergences on how best to proceed in Iraq marked a before and after in the United 
Nations, in the United States relationship with different members of the European 
Union and in the stance of international public opinion regarding Bush Administration’s 
“War on Terror”64. 
 
–Main themes identified: “War on Terror”, terrorists, terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Saddam Hussein, United Nations Resolutions, 
United Nations, Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
                                                            
60 The military operation was initially called “Operation Infinite Justice”, but Bush Administration 
decided to change it for “Operation Enduring Freedom” due to the objections of practitioners of Islam, 
who argued that only Allah can provide infinite justice. 
Cfr. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, “Operation Infinite Justice”. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/infinite-justice.htm [access November 10, 2012]. 
61 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to…”, op. cit. 
62 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to…”, op. cit. 
63 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to…”, op. cit. 
64 Many works address the international crisis over Iraq. Cfr. NIKOLAEV, Alexander G., HAKANEN, 
Ernest A., Leading to the 2003 Iraq War. The Global Media Debate, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
2006; BARBÉ, Esther, ¿Existe una brecha transatlántica? Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea tras la 
crisis de Irak, Catarata, Madrid, 2005; ALBA, Santiago, Washington contra el mundo, Foca, Madrid, 
2003; KRASNO, Jean E., SUTTERLIN, James S., The United Nations and Iraq. Defanging the Viper, 
Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003. 
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–Problem definition: 
Bush’s discourse on Iraq falls within its strategy of the “War on Terror”, “the first war 
of the 21st century”, which confronted the United States and the rest of the “civilized 
world”, defenders of global security and democracy, with “twin threats”: terrorism and 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of dictators65. Terrorists and 
outlaw regimes accept no laws or morality, and their violent ambitions are limitless66. 
 
In November 2001, the United States President had already warned about the possibility 
that terrorists used weapons of mass destruction. Now, the search and possession of 
these kinds of weapons by outlaw regimes makes the danger even greater. The regimes 
of Iraq, Iran and North Korea, which are part, along with the terrorists, of what Bush 
calls “axis of evil”, could use weapons of mass destruction to blackmail other countries, 
spread terror and commit mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to 
the terrorists, who would use them without hesitation67. 
Specifically, with respect to Iran, Bush says it is a country where there is no freedom, 
human rights or democracy. And regarding the North Korean government, he claims 
that it is an oppressive regime that condemns its people to live in fear and misery, a 
regime that has been developing nuclear weapons to inflict fear and win concessions on 
the international scene68. 
The United States President insists specially in the case of Iraq: he considers that it is 
clear that Saddam Hussein “has something to hide” from the civilized world69. 
First, he says that the Iraqi government fails to comply with United Nations resolutions, 
seeks weapons of mass destruction and supports terror. It could provide these arms to its 
terrorist allies or use them itself, making the 9/11 attacks “a prelude to far greater 
horrors”70. In addition, he claims that Hussein’s regime represses its people. In the 
Azores Summit it is recalled that Hussein started two wars of aggression against his 
neighbors, has turn Iraq into an international pariah and oppresses his citizens, thus 
representing a serious threat to the security of the region and the world. 
Second, Bush claims that the Iraqi breach of United Nations resolutions during twelve 
years challenges the authority and the foundational role of “the world’s most important 
multilateral body”, that is to struggle for peace making deliberations more than words 
and resolutions more than wishes71. The Iraqi regime represents the kind of aggressive 
threat that the United Nations was created to fight. Besides, Saddam Hussein’s gestures 
are designed to divide and drag the international community to a perpetual negotiation, 
never providing a real and concrete cooperation leading to disarmament. It can´t be 
allowed that in Iraq will happen the same as in North Korea, where there was a 
                                                            
65 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush: Monday ‘Moment of Truth’ for World on Iraq”, 
16/03/2003; WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Statement of the Atlantic Summit: Commitment to 
Transatlantic Solidarity”, 16/03/2003. 
66 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President´s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly”, 
12/09/2002. 
67 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers State of the Union Address”, 29/01/2002; 
WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President´s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly”, 
12/09/2002; WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers ‘State of the Union’”, 28/01/2003. 
68 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers ‘State…”, op. cit. 
69 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers State…”, op. cit. 
70 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President´s Remarks at the…”, op. cit. 
71 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President´s Remarks at the…”, op. cit.; “President Bush: 
Monday…”, op. cit. 
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mistaken confidence on negotiation to avert the country from developing nuclear 
weapons72. 
During the months of debate on Iraq, the United States President continues linking the 
“War on Terror” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: he recalls that the common security 
is also threatened by this ethnic and religious strife that is ancient but not inevitable73. 
 
–Remedy: 
According to Bush’s discourse, the “War on Terror” seeks to end with the terrorists and 
with those who harbor them. Also to prevent regimes seeking weapons of mass 
destruction from threatening the United States and the world. To do so, terrorists and 
their sponsor states must be prevented from achieving the materials, technology and 
experience necessary to develop weapons of mass destruction. Thus, overall, removing 
training camps and bringing terrorists to justice is proposed. Effective missile defenses 
must also be developed, in order to protect America and its allies from a sudden attack. 
These measures make necessary a large increase in defense and intelligence budget 
devoted to security in the foreign and domestic field74. 
Regarding the specific case of Iran, Bush expresses his support for the aspirations of the 
population to live in freedom, to choose their government and to determine their fate. 
As for North Korea, he says he is working with countries in the region to find a peaceful 
solution and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will only 
bring isolation, economic stagnation and difficulties75. 
Bush focuses his message on proposing solutions to the threat posed by Iraq. In his 
speech to the United Nations, he proposes five points that Hussein’s regime must meet 
if he wants peace and a last chance to disarm. These points are related to the 
performance of the resolutions issued on Iraq by the United Nations. First, eliminating 
all weapons of mass destruction and related material. Second, ending all support to 
terrorism, as required to any state. Third, stopping targeting sectors of the Iraqi civilian 
population. Fourth, releasing, giving explanations and collaborating regarding the Gulf 
War detained and disappeared personnel. Finally, ending illicit trade outside the “Oil for 
Food” program, accepting the United States administration of funds for the program, so 
that the money will serve to the benefit of the Iraqi people76. 
In January 2003, Bush considers that Hussein has missed the last opportunity given by 
Resolution 1.441, adopted on November 8, 2002. This resolution demands the Iraqi 
dictator to obey the disarmament obligations if he doesn’t want to expose himself to 
“serious consequences”. But Hussein hasn’t given explanations to the inspectors about 
the weapons of mass destruction, showing his contempt for the United Nations and the 
world’s opinion. Documents and materials are being hidden to the United Nations 
inspectors, and Iraqi intelligence officers pose as the scientists that inspectors have to 
interview while the real scientists are intimidated about what to say. The only 
explanation to all these maneuvers is a desire for domination, intimidation or attack by 
the Iraqi regime. To demonstrate the United States’ accusations Bush announces that, 
on February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell will show the United Nations Security 
Council information and intelligence evidences of the Iraqi regime’s illegal weapons 
                                                            
72 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers ‘State…”, op. cit. 
73 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President´s Remarks at the…”, op. cit. 
74 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers State…”, op. cit. 
75 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers ‘State…”, op. cit. 
76 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President´s Remarks at the…”, op. cit. 
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programs, its attempt to hide the weapons from the inspectors and its links with terrorist 
groups77. 
In March 2003, the Azores leaders insist that Hussein must comply with the resolutions 
imposed by the United Nations Security Council, especially with Resolution 1.441. This 
implies proving that he doesn´t have and is not developing weapons of mass 
destruction, letting the inspectors do their job in Iraq without any obstacle. The 
resolution warned that if Iraq did not disarm it would be disarmed by force: after four 
and a half months trying to get Hussein to cooperate, the Iraqi regime has not disarmed. 
The Azores leaders also remember that in the draft resolution they presented to the 
United States Security Council on March 7, 200378, the date March 17, 2003, was 
established as the deadline for the Iraqi President to fulfill the resolutions, disarm and 
avoid the “serious consequences” mentioned in Resolution 1.441. Therefore, they 
establish that if these conditions have not been met once the deadline has arrived, 
Hussein has two options: to leave the country or to face disarmament by force. Thus, 
responsibility for what happens in Iraq rests solely on him79. This is not a declaration of 
war, but the last chance offered to Hussein to achieve a political solution to the Iraqi 
problem80. 
According to the Azores leaders, the military presence in Iraq in order to ensure safety, 
the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the delivery of humanitarian aid and the 
reconstruction of the country, will be temporary, although the commitment to support 
the Iraqis will be long-range81. To do this, they ask for the help of the international 
community: they intend to work in partnership with international institutions, allies and 
donors, and to adopt the United Nations resolutions that may be necessary after the 
conflict82. 
Thus, to get a better future for the Iraqi people, the Azores leaders issue a joint 
declaration in which they pledge to work for an economic and democratic 
reconstruction that gets to achieve a free Iraq, respecting its territorial integrity and the 
members of ethnics and religious groups83. And they propose to ensure, through the 
United Nations General Secretary, that the “Oil for Food” program is met: Iraq’s natural 
                                                            
77 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers ‘State…”, op. cit. 
To read Powell’s statement before the United Nations Security Council cfr. WHITE HOUSE 
ARCHIVES, “U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council”, 05/02/2003. 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html [access November, 
10, 2012]. 
78 On February 24, 2003, The United States, the United Kingdom and Spain presented a draft resolution 
to the United States Security Council, which declared that Iraq had failed to meet the last opportunity to 
disarm granted by Resolution 1.441. On March 7, 2003, they included a deadline for Saddam to prove he 
had fully disarmed: March 17, 2003. That date was also the last day for the Security Council to vote for or 
against the draft resolution. On March 17, 2003, the draft resolution was finally removed without been 
voted in the Security Council, and Bush gave Saddam Hussein a final ultimatum of 48 hours to go into 
exile and avoid war. 
To read the draft resolution of the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain, on March 7, 2003. Cfr. 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, “Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution”. http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/res-iraq-
07mar03-en-rev.pdf [access November 10, 2012]. 
79 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush: Monday…”, op. cit. 
80 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush: Monday…”, op. cit.: “Statement of the Atlantic 
Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People”, 16/03/2003. 
81 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision…”, op. cit. 
82 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision…”, op. cit. 
83 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision…”, op. cit. 
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resources would be protected as a property, as a resource and for the benefit of the Iraqi 
people. 
Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bush’s discourse bets on an independent and 
democratic Palestine, living next to Israel in peace and security. Therefore, the United 
States will encourage both parts to take their responsibilities and will try to reach an 
agreement for the conflict84. This proposal is repeated at the Azores Summit, where it is 
declared that the peace process for the pacific coexistence of both states must be done 
with all the necessary security guarantees and putting an end to terrorism. The 
appointment of Abu Mazen as Palestinian leader with authority enough to confront 
terrorism and consolidate the reforms necessary to carry forward the peace process is 
valued as positive85. 
 
 
 
5.3. The evolution of Bush’s discourse: from Islamist terrorism to weapons of mass 
destruction 
 
The comparison of the evolution of the themes included in the two case studies suggests 
that, although some themes are recurring, others are clearly linked to the Afghanistan or 
the Iraq War86: 
 
Recurring themes Themes linked to the 
Afghanistan War 
Themes linked to the Iraq War 
·Terrorists 
·Terrorism 
·“War on Terror” 
·Israeli-Palestinian conflict  
·Osama Bin Laden 
·Al Qaeda 
·Taliban regime 
·Afghanistan 
·Saddam Hussein 
·Iraq, Iran, North Korea 
·Weapons of mass destruction 
·United Nations resolutions 
·United Nations 
 
Bush’s political discourse and its evolution in the two case studies reflect the premises 
and the evolution of the Bush Doctrine, as well as the aims of the public diplomacy 
strategy applied in the first place: the “War of Ideas”. 
In 2001, Bush’s discourse on the “War on Terror” defines the problem in a clear and 
simple way: 9/11 terrorist attacks have been “acts of war” against the “civilized world” 
carried out by terrorists driven by hatred of freedom and democracy. The President 
initially focuses on Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama Bin Laden. In a few days, he adds 
all those governments that somehow support international terrorism to the initial 
description of the enemy, pointing specifically to the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. At 
the end of 2001, Bush introduces a new element to his problem definition, which will be 
the main focus of his message during the Iraq crisis: terrorists could search and use 
weapons of mass destruction. Based on this idea, from January 2002, the description of 
the enemy considers terrorists and a group of countries (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) as 
an “axis of evil” that search and/or could have weapons of mass destruction, in order to 
deliver them to the terrorists or to use them themselves. Since then, terrorism itself 
                                                            
84 Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President´s Remarks at the…”, op. cit. 
85Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush: Monday…”, op. cit.: “Statement of the Atlantic 
Summit: Commitment…”, op. cit. 
86 The themes “weapons of mass destruction” and “United Nations resolutions” are already mentioned in 
the first case study, but they are much more developed in the second one. 
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remains in the background against the threat that, according to the United States 
President, Iraq represents. So, the premise used to intervene the Taliban regime 
(regimes that support or harbor terrorism are also enemies) gives way to the premise to 
intervene the Iraqi regime (regimes who have weapons of mass destruction could give 
them to terrorists or use them themselves). 
As a solution to terrorism, in 2001 Bush proposes the strategy of the “War on Terror”, a 
war on many fronts against the “global terror network” that includes terrorists and those 
who harbor them, and which tries to establish an agenda of peace and prosperity that 
works as an alternative to terrorism. 
The first military initiative of the “War on Terror” is the Afghanistan War, which begins 
just weeks after 9/11 when the Taliban refuse to meet Washington’s demands, for 
example handing over the terrorists harboring in their territory or releasing foreign 
prisoners. As it has been seen, from January 2002 the objective of the “War on Terror” 
evolves, and the struggle against the “axis of evil” regimes is included as part of it, 
although the political discourse focuses almost exclusively on Iraq. Just as Bush 
carefully details the reasons why Iraq is a threat to global security, he also details in a 
very specific way the conditions that Hussein’s regime must meet to avoid a military 
intervention. These conditions are related to the implementation of the United States 
Security Council resolutions and with the abandonment of any link with terrorism. 
In September 2002, at the United Nations, Bush sends a double message: on the Iraqi 
threat and on the United States commitment to diplomacy and to the United Nations 
proceedings. This way, a diplomatic agreement on Iraq is reached, and in November 
2002 the Security Council issues Resolution 1.441, which urges Hussein’s regime to 
allow, for one month, the inspections required to check if there are weapons of mass 
destruction. However, given the lack of concrete results and the inspectors’ request of 
more time, an international diplomatic debate begins, in which the United States claims 
that Hussein is not fulfilling Resolution 1.441 and that this resolution must be enforced, 
by force if necessary. Finally, the Iraq war begins in March 2003 without a specific 
United Nations resolution, precisely in order to fulfill one of its resolutions. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Mediatic diplomacy is an important type of public diplomacy, in which political 
discourse and the media acquire the maximum relevance for achieving foreign policy 
objectives. It is an activity that may act directly (through institutional media) or 
indirectly (trying to have a positive coverage in foreign media). In all cases, political 
discourse aims to transmit a specific frame (directly to the audience in the case of 
institutional media, or to foreign media in the other cases). If the frame is received 
positively, mediatic diplomacy will have been successful. 
To evaluate the success or failure of mediatic diplomacy in a media it is important, in 
the first place, to establish methods that serve to analyze the political discourse and  
its key aspects, as it has been done in this article. The identification of themes in Bush’s 
discourse is evidence that there are a series of themes specifically associated with the 
Afghanistan or Iraq War, and others that are associated with the “War on Terror” in 
general and repeated in the two case studies. Besides, the analysis of the functions of 
framing “problem definition” and “remedy” allows checking which framing 
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mechanisms have been included, how Bush’s discourse has been constructed and how it 
has evolved introducing new themes and interpretations that signal new problems and 
remedies. Finally, thanks also to the previous contextual study, the analysis process 
verifies that Bush’s frame during the first months of the “War on Terror” was 
coordinated with the objectives of the public diplomacy strategy “War of Ideas”, and 
that it incorporated the premises of Bush Doctrine. 
Thus, it has been confirmed that framing theory, and in particular the contributions of 
Jim A. Kuypers, Robert M. Entman and Stephen D. Reese, allow to design a process of 
political discourse analysis simple and effective. The analysis confirms Entman’s 
assertions: the most important functions of framing are “problem definition”, because it 
predetermines the rest of the frame, and “remedy”, because it directly promotes support 
(or opposition) to public policies. Reese’s view of framing as a constantly active 
process, that includes and excludes interpretations over time, is also confirmed. 
To determine whether the political discourse’s frame has had a positive coverage in the 
media object of study, it would be necessary to perform at least a second and third step, 
as Entman’s “cascade activation model” suggests. In a second analysis, the dominant 
frame transmitted by the media (different frames can coexist in the same media) should 
be identified, and also if there is a positive reception of the political dicourse’s frame 
and why. This requires a far more laborious and complicated analysis than that of 
political discourse. To determine which the dominant frame in the media is, all the 
pieces that address issues related to the terrorist attacks and the “War on Terror” should 
be analyzed in this case (even if they don’t refer to Bush’s speeches and statements 
directly). After comparing the political frame and the frame predominant in the media, 
to determine the cause of a positive or negative reception of the political frame multiple 
factors should be taken into account. For example, the editorial line of the newspaper, 
the individual perspective of columnists and analysts, the factors that condition 
journalists’ work the receipt of other frames or the political culture in which the media 
is inscribed. A third step to evaluate the success of mediatic diplomacy would consist in 
analyzing the influence of the media frame in public opinion. 
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